中共海軍戰略：武器裝備途徑分析

　　近年來，中共不斷擴張軍費、藉著採購及本身的研發大力提昇海、空武器裝備性能(林長盛, 1996)， 引發了世界各國，尤其是亞太地區國家對於「中國威脅論」的疑慮(國防部, 1995)， 以及實質上的軍備競賽(清文, 1996)。1995年的美濟礁事件過後不久、中共復於7月起至隔年3月，在台灣周邊海域發動一連串大規模準封鎖性質的軍事演習，更使國際間，尤其是亞太地區國家對於中共對該地區的軍事平衡與安全之威脅感到憂慮(甘棠, 1996)。 然而北京始終堅稱其發展軍備為一個「正常國家」的「正常行為」，特別是在一些不論就政治、軍事或是經濟上擁有關鍵性地位的領土（海）主權尚未回歸情況下，擁有足夠的武裝力量以應付各種意外事件及危機狀況實屬必要，因此被認為是威脅實在是遭到「妖魔化」之故。到目前為止。
　　上述看似矛盾而對抗的事件與看法，顯示出中共海軍戰略的破碎性格，還是有其內在一致的邏輯性？本文旨在透過中共海軍長時期的軍備發展內容，歸納其發展的主要方向，作為理解中共海軍戰略意涵的窗口，並期能對相關研究提出拋磚引玉之功。

　　In 1985, China’s highest military policy body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), reached a major decision. This decision required the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to make a strategic transition from preparing for “early, total, and nuclear war” to “peacetime army building” with an eye towards preparing for local, limited wars. While former implies an ideology-driven, imminent and major continental war where a massive Soviet invasion from the north would be dealt with, the latter refers to the limited armed conflicts that may arise from the issues of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, disputes over economic resources, and securing of major manufacturing platforms and trade-related transportation routes.
　　To the extent many of such issues, disputes, platforms, and routes are associated with China’s costal and maritime regions, the PLA Navy (PLAN) in China’s defense posture has become more pronounced. Subsequently, a substantial body of PLA literature has emerged to redefined the functions, warfare, arms, and organization of the PLAN.
　　This essay is aim at examining the content of such strategic thinking and its actual behavior, from the point of weapon angle.